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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal involves an interpretation of U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1. A jury convicted Robert Jenkins for unlawfully 
possessing firearm ammunition. The District Court 
increased Jenkins's offense level by two levels under 
U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 for obstructing justice by failing to appear 
at a state court hearing. Jenkins challenges the sentence 
enhancement only. For reasons that follow, we will reverse 
and remand for resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
On October 29, 1996, following a complaint from a local 
store owner, Philadelphia police officers arrested Robert 
Jenkins. He was charged with retail theft and possession of 
a firearm without a license, both violations of Pennsylvania 
law, and ordered to appear in state court on those charges. 
On three separate occasions -- November 6, 1996; March 
19, 1997; and March 4, 1999 -- Jenkins failed to appear. 
On March 3, 1999, the day before Jenkins's third failed 
appearance, an assistant United States attorney began 
preparing a federal complaint against him. On May 18, 
1999, federal prosecutors indicted Jenkins for illegally 
possessing firearm ammunition, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(1). Jenkins was arrested by federal officials on 
September 15, 1999. 
 
As part of a plea agreement, Jenkins pled guilty in federal 
court to being a felon in possession of ammunition, a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). Finding"obstruction of 
justice" under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1, the District Court added a 
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two-level enhancement for Jenkins's failure to appear in 
state court. Three levels were subtracted for acceptance of 
responsibility. With a total offense level of 19, Jenkins's 
guideline range was forty-six to fifty-seven months. He was 
sentenced to fifty-four months in prison, three years of 
supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. 
Without the two-level enhancement, Jenkins's offense level 
would have been 17, and he would have faced a guideline 
range of thirty-seven to forty-six months. 
 
In his initial appeal, Jenkins challenged the District 
Court's imposition of the two-level upward adjustment. The 
government filed a consent motion for remand, which we 
granted. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court 
found: (1) the federal investigation of Jenkins commenced 
on March 3, 1999; and (2) Jenkins was unaware of the 
federal investigation on that date. Nevertheless, the District 
Court determined Jenkins's awareness of the state 
proceedings provided sufficient grounds for applying the 
two-level enhancement. The District Court confirmed its 
prior sentence, including the obstruction enhancement. 
This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
Our review of the District Court's interpretation and 
application of the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United 
States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1997). We 
review the District Court's factual findings for clear error. 
United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. 
 
United States Sentencing Guideline S 3C1.1, entitled 
"Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice," 
provides: 
 
       If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
       attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 
       justice during the course of the investigation, 
       prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of 
       conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) 
       the defendant's offense of conviction and any related 
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       conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the 
       offense level by 2 levels. 
 
Interpreting a pre-1998 version of S 3C1.1, the Supreme 
Court held the guideline requires sentencing courts to 
"review the evidence and make independent findings 
necessary to establish a willful impediment to or 
obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same." United 
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). The guideline 
explicitly applies when a defendant "willfully fail[s] to 
appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding." U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1 app. n.4(e).1 The District Court found Jenkins 
subject to a two-level enhancement, reasoning, "[I]f a 
defendant knows he is engaging in obstructive conduct 
concerning the Federal investigation or concerning a closely 
related State offense and the obstruction occurs during the 
time of the Federal investigation, the criteria of Section 
3C1.1 have been met." (App. 135a (emphasis added)) 
 
Jenkins concedes his "obstructive" conduct-- the failure 
to appear in state court -- occurred after the federal 
investigation against him began, satisfying the temporal 
aspect of the enhancement. But Jenkins contends he was 
incapable of "willfully" obstructing justice because he was 
unaware of the federal investigation on March 4, 1999.2 
 
The threshold issue is whether the inclusion of the word 
"willfully" in U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 requires the government to 
prove Jenkins was aware of the federal investigation. We 
have plenary review over this question of law.3 In this case, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The examples set forth in the commentary to U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 are not 
exhaustive. See id. app. n.3 ("Obstructive conduct can vary widely in 
nature, degree of planning, and seriousness. . . . Although the conduct 
to which this adjustment applies is not subject to precise definition, 
comparison of the examples set forth in Application Notes 4 and 5 
should assist the court in determining whether application of this 
adjustment is warranted in a particular case."). 
2. Jenkins also challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), 
which formed the basis for his conviction. We recently upheld the statute 
under a similar challenge. United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d 
Cir. 2001). Therefore, the only substantial issue on appeal is the two- 
level sentencing enhancement. 
3. It would appear that "willfully" is a term with "no fixed meaning." 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 63 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
The word has "a wide variety of definitions" and is often construed "in 
accordance with its context." McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 
128, 137 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 
                                4 
  
the term "willfully" must be considered in context, with 
reference to the other words in U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. 
 
We interpret United States Sentencing Guidelines the 
same way we interpret statutes, "using the terms' meaning 
in ordinary usage." United States v. Loney , 219 F.3d 281, 
284 (3d Cir. 2000). In S 3C1.1(A), the Sentencing 
Commission chose to place "willfully" directly before 
"obstructed" and "impeded," modifying both verbs. Its 
meaning, therefore, in ordinary usage is that a defendant 
must have willfully obstructed or impeded the 
administration of justice "during the course of the 
investigation . . . of the instant offense of conviction." To 
read in anything further would strain its ordinary meaning. 
Cf. United States v. Clayton, 172 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 
1999) (Wiener, J., concurring) ("Whether examined under 
legal canons of statutory interpretation or plain English 
rules of syntax, the phrase `during the investigation' should 
be read to modify the immediately preceding phrase, 
`administration of justice,' not the more remote clause [`the 
defendant willfully . . . attempted to obstruct or impede']."). 
 
In view of the language, structure, and context of 
U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1, we believe the ordinary meaning of 
"willfully" is "deliberately or intentionally"; in other words, 
not "negligently, inadvertently, or accidentally." Jenkins 
does not dispute that his failure to appear in state court 
was an intentional action, one taken with full awareness of 
the proceedings.4 On this threshold issue, Jenkins's 
conduct represented a "willful obstruction." 
 
Jenkins contends the guideline requires an awareness on 
his part that a federal investigation had begun. The term 
"awareness" does not appear in U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. Nor do we 
believe that it can be properly implied. Incorporating such 
a requirement would contravene the purpose of the 1998 
amendment to the guideline. As the Sentencing 
Commission explained, the amendment clarified "what the 
term `instant offense' means in the obstruction of justice 
guideline." U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 581.5 At the time of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Jenkins does not claim that his failure to appear resulted from 
negligence, for example, like forgetting the date of the hearing. 
 
5. The Commission amended the language in response to inter-circuit 
disagreement whether sentencing courts could impose the enhancement 
 
                                5 
  
amendment, several courts of appeals had affirmed 
sentencing enhancements based on the obstruction of state 
proceedings. E.g., United States v. Self , 132 F.3d 1039, 
1042 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Section 3C1.1 draws no distinction 
between a federal investigation and a state investigation."); 
United States v. Smart, 41 F.3d 263, 265-66 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(defendant's use of a false name in state court proceedings 
obstructed closely related federal proceedings by delaying 
his arrest); United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d 907, 911-12 
(1st Cir. 1993) (defendant's attempted escape from state 
authorities obstructed closely related federal proceedings by 
prolonging the onset of federal proceedings). The 
Commission nevertheless decided not to require "awareness 
of the federal proceeding" in U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. As the 
government observes, the 1998 amendment ensured the 
section applied to obstruction in related, non-federal 
matters. Without further guidance from the Sentencing 
Commission, we will not write in a requirement that the 
defendant be aware of the federal investigation. 
 
Jenkins observes that three of our sister circuits have 
said in this context, "willfully" must imply some level of 
awareness by the defendant of the federal investigation. In 
United States v. Brown, 237 F.3d 625, 628 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1981 (2001), the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held: 
 
       However, the term ["willfully"] generally connotes some 
       kind of deliberate or intentional conduct. Logically, [the 
       defendant's] actions cannot have been willful unless he 
       had some idea that he was being investigated. 
       Otherwise, the adjustment would serve no deterrent 
       purpose. 
 
See also United States v. Lister, 53 F.3d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 
1995) ("[A] defendant's awareness of the commencement of 
an investigation is relevant and necessary for the 
obstruction of justice enhancement."); United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
for conduct in cases closely related to the federal offenses of 
conviction. 
Subsection (B) now indicates the obstruction "must relate either to the 
defendant's offense of conviction (including any relevant conduct) or to a 
closely related case." Id. 
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Oppedahl, 998 F.2d 584, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1993) (relying on 
deterrence principles to find a defendant must be aware of 
an investigation to be subject to the enhancement). 
 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has held awareness is not a prerequisite for imposing the 
obstruction-of-justice requirement. In United States v. 
Snyder, 189 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 1999), the court observed, 
"It is clear, however, that a defendant need not know that 
he is under investigation at the time of the obstructive 
conduct." Id. at 648 (citing United States v. Schmidt, 47 
F.3d 188, 192 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995)).6 Given the guideline's 
plain text and the stated purpose of the 1998 amendment, 
we endorse this approach. 
 
Jenkins contends such a conclusion depends on the 
fortuity of initiating an investigation the day before his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Schmidt, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in 
dicta, "Even if we were to reach the merits of the [defendants'] appeal, 
we 
would affirm the sentences imposed. First, the district court's 
enhancement of the [defendants'] sentences under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 for 
willful obstruction of justice was proper, despite the fact that the 
defendants' actions -- removing water sampling probes from planting 
lines -- occurred before they knew they were under investigation." 47 
F.3d at 192 n.3. For that proposition, the Schmidt court cited United 
States v. Polland, 994 F.2d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993). Considering the 
pre-1998 version of U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1, the Polland court held: 
 
       Section 3C1.1 indicates that the obstruction of justice enhancement 
       does not apply to any and all obstructive conduct that a defendant 
       may have committed, but instead applies only to willful attempts 
"to 
       obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the 
       investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." 
       U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. In other words, section 3C1.1 does not 
       contemplate enhancements for obstruction of justice if the relevant 
       conduct impedes the investigation or prosecution of a separate 
       crime. 
 
Id. The Polland court construed the pre-1998 language "instant offense" 
to mean "instant offense of conviction," a change formalized in the 1998 
amendments. Id. Construing the commentary accompanying the 
guideline, the court said, "[T]he commentary clarifies that the 
significant 
factor is not merely the timing of the obstruction but rather whether the 
obstruction or attempt involves evidence that is material to the 
investigation or prosecution of the instant offense of conviction." Id. 
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unrelated appearance in state court. But this type of "line 
drawing" is common in the law. Statutes of limitations and 
other time-bar rules impose legal consequences based on 
specific timing. Because a federal investigation against 
Jenkins could have begun two days later does not change 
the fact that the investigation, commenced before Jenkins's 
"obstructive" conduct, met the textual requirements of 
U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1.7 
 
IV. 
 
That does not, however, end our inquiry. Federal 
proceedings here were initiated almost three years after 
related state proceedings began. Jenkins admits he was 
aware of the state proceedings pending against him in 
Pennsylvania, consciously failing to appear for hearings on 
three separate dates. But Jenkins's failure to appear in 
state court before his federal indictment had no effect 
whatsoever on the later federal proceedings. The 
government presented no evidence the federal investigation 
against Jenkins, initiated on March 3, 1999, was 
obstructed or impeded by his failure to appear in state 
court the next day. The federal indictment was apparently 
issued when it was prepared, without any delay engendered 
by Jenkins's failure to appear in state court. We exercise 
plenary review over the application of U.S.S.G.S 3C1.1 in 
these circumstances. 
 
The government contends Jenkins's absence from the 
state court proceeding is relevant for sentencing purposes 
because it indicates his overall culpability. But U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1 is not an invitation to consider every instance in 
which a defendant acted in a blameworthy fashion. Only 
conduct obstructing the "instant offense of conviction" is 
relevant to sentencing.  See United States v. Luca, 183 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Judge Becker does not join in Part III because he believes that the 
correct interpretation of U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 is stated in United States v. 
Brown, 237 F.3d 625, 628 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1981 
(2001), United States v. Lister, 53 F.3d 66, 71 (5th Cir. 1995), and 
United 
States v. Oppedahl, 998 F.2d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1993). See supra at 6, 
7. However, inasmuch as he joins in Part IV, he concurs in the 
judgment. 
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1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 1999) ("For the obstruction of justice 
enhancement to apply, the district court must find that the 
defendant willfully provided a materially false statement to 
law enforcement officers that actually obstructed or 
impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the 
instant federal offense."). Without some nexus between the 
obstruction and the federal offense, U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 is 
inapplicable. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has said the 
governing standard is the "effect of the obstructive conduct 
rather than the level of law enforcement that was 
obstructed." Id. We agree. The application notes to U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1 observe that some forms of obstructive conduct -- 
including fleeing from arrest, providing incomplete or 
misleading information during a presentence investigation, 
and making false statements while not under oath-- do 
not merit the enhancement. U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 app. n.5. In 
contrast, where such conduct "significantly obstruct[s] or 
impede[s] the official investigation or prosecution of the 
instant offense," a sentence is properly increased. Id. app. 
n.4(e). 
 
Prior cases have affirmed sentence enhancements based 
on conduct involving state court proceedings that 
obstructed the federal investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing of the defendant. In United States v. Imenec, 193 
F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1999), the defendant was scheduled to 
appear in state court on November 26, 1991, for a 
preliminary hearing. Id. at 207. His failure to do so 
prevented federal prosecutors, who had secured a warrant 
for the defendant's arrest on November 25, 1991, from 
detaining him. Id. We affirmed the imposition of a two-level 
enhancement under the pre-1998 version of U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1, stating: 
 
       Based on the text and purpose of S 3C1.1, we conclude 
       that the Sentencing Commission's intent was to impose 
       an enhancement for any conduct that obstructs an 
       investigation, prosecution, or sentencing proceeding 
       that is based on the criminal conduct underlying the 
       specific statutory offense for which the defendant is 
       being sentenced. Section 3C1.1 imposes a sanction for 
       conduct that obstructs a criminal investigation, even 
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       though the investigation has not matured into a 
       prosecution and indeed, even though no thought has 
       yet been given to what the appropriate criminal charge 
       might be. 
 
Id. But where the obstructive conduct relates only to an 
ongoing state prosecution, with no discernable effect on the 
federal proceedings, enhancement under U.S.S.G.S 3C1.1 
is improper. Cf. United States v. Perez, 50 F.3d 396, 400 
(7th Cir. 1995) (vacating an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1 where "the obstructive conduct only affected [the 
defendant's] state prosecution and had no effect on the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of [the 
defendant's] federal offense"); United States v. Adediran, 26 
F.3d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding the "instant offense" 
language in U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1, pre-amendment,"requires 
some connection between the obstructed state proceedings 
and the investigation of the federal offense"). 
 
In United States v. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 2001), 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a two- 
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 where the 
defendant fled from state custody and was subsequently 
indicted by federal authorities. Id. at 240. The court found 
the defendant's escape from state officials frustrated the 
federal proceedings: 
 
       [The defendant] was still on the run when federal 
       charges were filed against him. The fact that he was on 
       the run rather than in the custody of the state would 
       have made it much more difficult for federal authorities 
       to prosecute [him]. . . . [The defendant's] obstructive 
       conduct -- escape -- did have an effect on the federal 
       prosecution. 
 
Id. We believe Roberts is distinguishable on its facts. As 
stated, Jenkins failed to appear in state court on March 4, 
1999. The sealed federal indictment was not issued until 
March 18, 1999. While the assistant United States attorney 
began preparing the indictment on March 3, 1999, there is 
no claim that Jenkins's absence from state court the next 
day compromised the federal investigation in any way. 
Therefore, unlike in Roberts, Jenkins is not more "culpable" 
for federal sentencing purposes because of his conduct 
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before the state tribunal. The two-level enhancement for 
obstruction of justice was improper. 
 
V. 
 
Despite several amendments, U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 is no 
model of clarity. In its current construction, we find the 
defendant need not be aware of the federal investigation at 
the time of the obstructive conduct. But the obstructive 
conduct cannot merely affect some global application of 
"the administration of justice." The federal proceedings 
must be obstructed or impeded by the defendant's conduct. 
In other words, there must be a nexus between the 
defendant's conduct and the investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing of the federal offense. Jenkins's failure to appear 
in state court on March 4, 1999 did not obstruct the federal 
proceedings initiated against him the previous day. 
Imposing a two-level enhancement for this conduct would 
neither deter future defendants from acting similarly nor 
serve the ends of justice in this case. 
 
VI. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the finding of the 
District Court imposing a two-level enhancement for 
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 and remand 
for resentencing. 
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